Black recognized that government eradication of inequality in its last, private lair implicated the state action doctrine. 24 The doctrine restricts all but Thirteenth Amendment violations to acts of government, not private parties. 25 Private suppression of speech or private denials of due process do not violate the Constitution, according to this doctrine. Indeed, to insist on constitutional purity in private domains is to invade liberty rather than protect it.
Black thus did not think all private activity should be vulnerable to constitutional treatment. 26 But he also believed that the collisions of liberty occasioned by protecting private power were not all unavoidable, and often overstated in some contexts. 27 More importantly, he thought that when one liberty did have to trump the other, we should keep our reality wits about us. 28 For example, If fraudulent racist "private school" schemes are to be condemned-and they certainly are if our legal system is not too imbecile to live-and if a situation presents itself of a non-racist private school scheme, as to which none of the Brown considerations apply, then it seems to me the very life of sound legal method hangs on its capacity to conceptualize and to give effect to this distinction.
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In short, Black saw the thicket. He did not blink in the face of two powerful arguments that often dog efforts to expand constitutional liberties: that expansion can invade religious freedom, and may threaten other forms of private dissent from constitutional principles that government must respect. 30 He cut a straight line through the thicket. And history, most would likely agree, has proven him right. Moreover, Black did so in a manner devoid of excessive theorizing, toe-in-theground equivocation, or footnote-laden caveats. 31 He wrote like a dream. Black also did not distance himself from the moral imperatives. 32 Where he accused others of imbecility or callowness, he held himself accountable for these 24 Id. at 17. 25 See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948) (stating the actions inhibited by the Fourteenth Amendment inhibit states and not private parties). 26 Unfinished Business, supra note 15, at 9. 27 See "State Action," supra note 9, at 91 (calling for an end to bright line rules of state action doctrine and instead to have a "shift in approach, attitude, and expectation"). 28 See Unfinished Business, supra note 15, at 26 (calling for people to be aware that the "dangers" of racial equality expanding are not as terrible as they presume). 29 Id. at 27. 30 See id. at 25-26 (referring to the fact that many argue that before racial equality can be expanded upon, the collateral consequences on other fields, like religion, must be analyzed). 31 See Lawfulness, supra note 2; Unfinished Business, supra note 15. 32 Unfinished Business, supra note 15, at 12-13. shortcomings too. 33 He reserved his anger for injustice worthy of it, but expressed it in a manner that called up the better angels of others even when they stumbled. 34 In this respect and so many others, Black's rhetorical style was the antithesis of the pugilistic, derisive style of modern legal scolds, including some Supreme Court Justices. 35 Finally, Black marched in the trenches, as a lawyer for civil rights causes, rather than merely imploring from the podium or the bench. 36 Liberty and equality were not lofty abstractions to Black, but personal and practical imperatives. 37 He worked to erase the stains he came to see in his own life, in his own privileges, and his own private lairs of liberty. 38 This Essay is dedicated to Charles Black, and to his clear-eyed vision of what matters most in constitutional liberty and equality. It harkens back to his insights, and argues his approach remains stunningly relevant to modern problems, especially the modern constitutional issue of whether the Constitution protects a right to samesex marriage.
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Black's pragmatism, his mastery of constitutional methods and keen sense of their limitations, his preference for simplicity over jargon, and his poetic 40 dominion over words summon up the exactly right way to write, think, and feel about this issue, and how best to answer some of the stormy indictments of thinking otherwise about it. He cuts a path through this thicket, too.
Scholars and judges should read the recent same-sex marriage cases with Black's candle hovering above the pages. They should review the Court's work with his voice in their heads, reminding them not to be imbeciles, or failures in matters of will and honesty. 41 They should consider Black's admonition, borrowed from Anthony Powell, that "any healthy human being carries with him always the means of bringing about 33 See Lawfulness, supra note 2; Unfinished Business, supra note 15. 34 See Lawfulness, supra note 2; Unfinished Business, supra note 15. 35 The top of this list has to be Justice Scalia, whose acid pen dripped over recent dissents. See King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2500-01 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (describing the majority opinion as "[p]ure applesauce" and "jiggery-pokery"); Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2630 n.22 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (saying he would rather "hide [his] head in a bag" than join the majority opinion, and describing the opinion as a descent "to the mystical aphorisms of the fortune cookie"). 36 his own disgrace or death." 42 They should try to live, as Black did, on the right side of history as it unfolds before them, unafraid to take that task seriously-as seriously as life or death-and to be measured accordingly in time. As he asked his contemporaries, over forty-five years ago, to do, modern lawyers and jurists too should ask themselves: "May not our living generation take the words [of the Declaration of Independence] not as a statement of creation already performed, but as an invitation to participate in that ongoing work of a creation whose goal they define?" 43 And as modern scholars assess the Court's handiwork in this area, may they avoid past errors-the sterile search for "neutral principles"
44 that run like water through cold fingers-and seek instead to emulate the sturdy, warm, and enduring wisdom of Black. May they dare to defend the Court for doing what history surely will reveal to be the right answer, however imperfectly defended or expressed, rather than rush to rewrite it 45 or critique it by their lights. To show how this might occur, this Essay borrows Black's own words about Brown, and layers them directly onto the same-sex marriage controversy. Only the italicized words are new. The rest is pure Black light, shining through the decades. It ends with Black's imagined rebuttal to Chief Justice Roberts's dissent in Obergefell v. Hodges.
I. THE LAWFULNESS OF THE MARRIAGE CASES

47
If the cases outlawing prohibitions on same-sex marriage 48 were wrongly decided, then they ought to be overruled. One can go further: if dominant professional opinion ever forms and settles on the belief that they were wrongly decided, then they will be overruled, slowly or all at once, openly or silently. The insignificant error, however palpable, can stand, because the convenience of settlement outweighs the discomfort of error. But the hugely consequential error cannot stand and does not stand.
There is pragmatic meaning then, there is call for action, in the suggestion that the marriage cases cannot be justified. In the long run, as a corollary, there is practical 42 Id. 43 and not merely intellectual significance in the question whether these cases were rightly decided. I think they were rightly decided, by overwhelming weight of reason, and I intend here to say why I hold this belief. My liminal difficulty is rhetorical-or, perhaps more accurately, one of fashion. Simplicity is out of fashion, and the basic scheme of reasoning on which these cases can be justified is awkwardly simple. First, the equal protection and due process clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment should be read as saying that persons are not to be significantly and irrationally disadvantaged by the laws of the states with respect to the most basic liberties. 49 Secondly, denying access to marriage-a basic liberty-is a massive and irrational intentional disadvantaging of persons on the basis of sexual orientation, as such, by state law. 50 No subtlety at all. Yet I cannot disabuse myself of the idea that that is really all there is to the marriage cases: irrational and intentional discrimination with respect to a basic liberty, based on sexual orientation differences from the majority.
[I]f both these propositions can be supported by the preponderance of argument, the cases were rightly decided. If they cannot be so supported, the cases are in perilous condition.
As 57 There is in this no denial of the Lawrence, Windsor, and Obergefell principle; the fault of Bowers is in the psychology, philosophy, and sociology of its minor premise.
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The lurking difficulty lies not in "gay rights" cases but in the total philosophy of "equal protection and due process" in the wide sense. "Equal protection" and "due process," as they apply to the whole of state law, must be consistent with the imposition of disadvantage on some, for all law imposes disadvantage on some; to give driver's licenses only to good drivers is to disadvantage bad drivers. And of course the states must be left relatively unmolested by federal constitutional law with respect to its countless day to day policy choices. Thus the word "rational" necessarily finds its way into "equal protection" and "due process," in the application of these latter concepts to law in general. And it is inevitable, and right, that "rational," in this broader context, should be given its older sense of "supportable by reasoned considerations." "Equal" thereby comes to mean not really "equal," but "equal unless a fairly tenable reason exists for inequality." "Due process" thereby comes to mean an exceedingly modest baseline expectation of nonarbitrary promotion of plausible public ends. 59 As the gravity of the deprivation in question grows 55 Id. at 2597-98 (internal citations omitted But the whole tragic background of the [F]ourteenth [A]mendment forbids the feedback infection of its central purpose with the necessary qualifications that have attached themselves to its broader and so largely accidental radiations. It may have been intended that "equal protection" and "due process" go forth into wider fields than the racial, and to protect other groups where subordination-driven irrationalities and caste concerns loom. But history puts it entirely out of doubt that the chief and all-dominating purpose was to ensure equal protection for African Americans. And this intent can hardly be given the self-defeating qualification that necessity has written on equal protection and due process as applied to carbonic gas. "Reasonableness" in this context surely demands more.
If it is so, then "equal protection" for African Americans means "equality until a tenable reason for inequality is proferred by the government." The burden of proof has shifted.
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The test cannot be the shabby rationality required of states in crafting mineral and gas laws, 64 or that the inequality may persist unless no reason at all can be assigned by a state legislature for African Americans not being permitted to hold property, sign wills, marry, testify in court, walk the streets, go to (even segregated) school, ride public transportation, and so on . . 63 Here, it is the government that must provide evidence of reasonableness in order to meet the burden for creating inequality, as opposed to the burden originally born by the objecting party. Id.
64 See generally Lindsley v. Nat. Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61 (1911) (involving state statutes registering water, gas, and oil pumping on an owner's land, where the court held the burden was on the objecting party to prove a lack of reasonable basis for the law, and that the state may claim a prima facie defense where there is not arbitrary discrimination and there is some rational basis to the statute). What guidance do we gain from history? It once was urged that a special qualification was written on the concept of "equality" by the history of the adoption of the amendment-that an intent can be made out to exclude segregation of the races from those legal discriminations invalidated by the requirement of equality, whether or not it actually works inequality.
68 A similar argument was made 80 years later in defense of antimiscegenation laws. 69 This historical point, as it related to segregation, was discussed and documented by Professor Alexander Bickel, 70 who, though he found convincing arguments for the conclusion that school segregation was not among the evils the framers of the amendment intended for immediate correction, suggested that they intended at the same time to set up a general concept for later concrete application. Other writers of that era took somewhat similar views. The data brought forward by Professor Bickel do not seem to me as persuasive, on his first point-the one about specific intent of the Reconstruction Framers on segregation-as they did to him.
But in supporting his second point Bickel developed a line of thought tending to establish that the legislative history did not render the segregation decisions improper, and I am glad the Court ultimately joined him in that practical conclusion in Brown v. Board of Education. I would add only one point: The question of the "intent" of the men of 1866 on segregation as we know it calls for a far chancier guess than is commonly supposed, for they were unacquainted with the institution as it developed thereafter.
From this point follows another: To guess their verdict upon other institutions, including marriage, as they function in the early twenty-first century supposes an imaginary hypothesis which grows more preposterous as it is sought to be made more vivid. They can in the nature of the case have bequeathed us only their generalities; the specifics lay unborn as they disbanded. 
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Then does a modern prohibition on same-sex marriage offend against the equal protection and due process generalities?
Equality and due process, like all general concepts, have marginal areas where philosophic difficulties are encountered. But if a whole class of persons find themselves confined within a system which is set up and continued for the very purpose, or with the actual effect, of keeping them in an inferior position unrelated to their abilities or contributions to the general welfare, and if the question is whether they are being treated "reasonably" and "equally," I think we ought to exercise one of the sovereign prerogatives of philosophers-that of laughter. The only question remaining (after we get our laughter under control) is whether the same-sex marriage prohibitions answer to this description.
Here I must confess a tendency to start laughing all over again. I was raised in a Texas town where the pattern of discrimination against gays and lesbians was firmly fixed. I am sure it never occurred to anyone, gay or straight, to question its meaning. The fiction of "reasonableness" or "equality" was just about on a level with the fiction of "finding" in an action of trover. I think few candid Texans would deny this. Modern Americans may be misled by the entirely sincere protestations of many people that traditional marriage laws are better for all people, including gays and lesbians, and not intended to hurt them. 73 But I think a little probing would demonstrate that what is meant is that it is better for gays and lesbians to accept a position of inferiority, at least for the indefinite future.
But the subjectively obvious, if queried, must be backed up by more public materials. What public materials assure me that my reading of the social meaning of prohibitions on same-sex marriage is not a mere idiosyncrasy?
First, of course, is history. Traditional marriage laws are historically and contemporaneously associated in a functioning complex with practices which are indisputably and grossly discriminatory. I have in mind especially the long-continued and still largely effective exclusion of sexual minorities from prominent political office. 84 Here we have two things. First, a certain group of people is "segregated"-indeed they are afraid to publicly admit their membership in the group. Secondly, at about the same time, the very same group of people is effectively barred from the common political life of the community-from all open presence in political power. Then we are solemnly told that their exclusion from marriage and other rights is not intended to harm them, or to stamp them with the mark of inferiority. How long must we keep a straight (literally and figuratively, with pun wholly intended) face?
Here it may be added that, generally speaking, marriage prohibitions are the pattern in communities where the extralegal patterns of discrimination against LGBT people are the tightest, where they are subjected to the strictest codes of "unwritten law" as to job opportunities, social intercourse, patterns of housing, going to the back door, being called names like "sissy," "faggot," or "dyke," and all the rest of the whole sorry business. Of course these things, in themselves, need not and usually do not involve "state action," and hence the [F]ourteenth [A]mendment cannot apply to them. But they can assist us in understanding the meaning and assessing the impact of state action.
"Separate but equal" forms of marriage-cohabitation, or even domestic partnerships with some benefits-are almost never really equal. 85 excuse those who have remained acquiescent members of a community that lived the Molochian child-destroying lie that put them forward as "equal," or "rational." Attention is usually focused on these inequalities as things in themselves, correctable by detailed decrees. I am more interested in their very clear character as evidence of what same-sex marriage prohibitions mean to the people who impose them and to the people who are subjected to them. This evidentiary character cannot be erased by one-step-ahead-of-the-marshal correction, though this is precisely how gay rights have proceeded-incrementally and not in the sudden rush some have wrongly claimed brings us now to the marriage cases. 86 Can a system which, in all that can be measured, has practiced the grossest inequality, actually have been "equal" or "rational" in intent, in total social meaning and impact? "Thy speech maketh thee manifest . . ."; Same-sex marriage prohibitions, in all visible things, speak only haltingly any dialect but that of inequality and irrationality.
Further arguments could be piled on top of one another, for we have here to do with the most conspicuous characteristic of a whole national culture. It is actionable defamation to call a straight man gay. 87 Even effeminate or masculine affect, in the "wrong" body, puts one in the inferior "gay" category for many social purposes. 88 
And even many of those who would defend gay people's rights would feel great offense, or worse, if misread or labeled as "gay."
89 [T] his is the way in which one deals with a taint, such as a carcinogen in cranberries.
The various items I have mentioned differ in weight; not every one would suffice in itself to establish the character of same-sex marriage prohibitions. Taken together they are of irrefragable strength. The society that has just lost the gay man or lesbian as a criminal, that has just lost out in an attempt to deny him or her local law protection and more, the society that views his or her sexuality as a contamination and his or her name as an insult, the society that extralegally imposes on him or her humiliating marks of low caste and that until yesterday kept him or her in line by criminal laws and even violence-this society, careless of his or her consent, moves to cut off access to marriage. The Court that refused to see the inequality and irrationality of this as a matter of constitutional law, or that insisted instead that the matter should be relegated to the political process and majoritarian lawmaking, 90 would be making the only kind of law that can be warranted outrageous in advancelaw based on self-induced blindness, on flagrant contradiction of known fact.
I have stated all these points shortly because they are matters of common notoriety, matters not so much for judicial notice as for the background of educated people who live in the world. A court may advise itself of them as it advises itself of the facts that we are "a religious people," that the country is more industrialized than in Jefferson's day, that children are the natural objects of fathers' bounty, that criminal sanctions are commonly thought to deter, that steel is a basic commodity in our economy, that the imputation of unchastity is harmful to a woman. Such judgments, made on such a basis, are in the foundations of all law, decisional as well as statutory; it would be the most unneutral of principles, improvised ad hoc, to require that a court faced with the present problem refuse to note a plain fact about the society of the United States-the fact that the social meaning of same-sex marriage prohibitions is to put gay men and lesbians in a position of walled-off inferiority with respect to the most intimate and profound of relationships-or the other equally plain fact that such treatment is hurtful to human beings. Southern courts, on the basis of just such a judgment, have held that the placing of a white person in [ I think that some of the artificial mist of puzzlement called into being around the marriage question originates in a single fundamental mistake. The issue is seen in terms of what might be called the metaphysics of sociology: "Must Same-Sex Marriage Prohibitions Amount to Discrimination?" That is an interesting question; someday the methods of sociology may be adequate to answering it. But it is not our question. Our question is whether inequality and irrationality inhere in these prohibitions where imposed by law in the twenty-first century in certain specific states in the American Union. And that question has meaning and can find an answer only on the ground of history and of common knowledge about the facts of life in the times and places aforesaid. Now I need not and do not maintain that the evidence is all one way; it never is on issues of burning, fighting concern. Let us not question here the good faith of those who assert that same-sex marriage prohibitions represent no more than an attempt to furnish a wholesome opportunity for parallel development of traditional marriages and families; 92 let us rejoice at the few scattered instances they can bring forward to support their view of the matter. But let us then ask which balance-pan flies upward.
The case seems so one sided that it is hard to make out what is being protested against when it is asked, rhetorically, how the Court can possibly advise itself of the real character of the same-sex marriage prohibition. It seems that what is being said is that, while no actual doubt exists as to what the same-sex marriage prohibition is for and what kind of societal pattern it supports and implements, there is no ritually sanctioned way in which the Court, as a Court, can permissibly learn what is obvious to everybody else and to the Justices as individuals. But surely, confronted with such a problem, legal acumen has only one proper task-that of developing ways to make it permissible for the Court to use what it knows; any other counsel is of despair. And, equally surely, the fact that the Court has assumed as true a matter of common knowledge in regard to broad societal patterns, is (to say the very least) pretty far down the list of things to protest against. Let me take up a few peripheral points. It is true that the specifically hurtful character of same-sex marriage prohibitions, as a net matter in the life of each gay person, may be hard to establish. Not all want marriage, care about exclusion from it, or think it is a wise end for the movement to pursue. It seems enough to say of this that no such demand is made of other constitutional rights. To have a confession beaten out of one might in some particular case be the beginning of a new and better life. To be subjected to a racially differentiated curfew might be the best thing in the world for some individual boy. A man might ten years later go back to thank the policeman who made him get off the platform and stop making a fool of himself. Religious persecution proverbially strengthens faith. Not all heterosexual people believe in marriage or want any part of it. 93 We do not ordinarily go that far, or look so narrowly into the matter. common sense, has the designed and generally apprehended effect of putting its victims at a disadvantage, is enough for law. At least it always has been enough.
I also can heartily concur in the judgment that the marriage prohibition harms straights as much as it does gay people. Sadism rots the policeman; the suppressor of thought loses light; the community that forms into a mob, and goes down and dominates a trial, may wound itself beyond healing. Can this reciprocity of hurt, this fated mutuality that inheres in all inflicted wrong, serve to validate the wrong itself?
Finally it is doubtless true that the same-sex marriage cases represented a choice between two kinds of freedom of association, two versions of marriage. 94 Freedom from the massive wrong of prohibitions on same-sex marriage entails a corresponding loss of freedom on the part of those who want the public meaning of marriage to include only their unions, and who must now associate with the concept of marriage so altered. 95 It is possible to state the competing claims in symmetry, and to ask whether there are constitutional reasons for preferring the same-sex couples' desire for merged participation in the institution of marriage to the dissenting persons' desire for an institution without these same-sex marriages in proximity.
The question must be answered, but I would approach it in a way which seems to me more normal-the way in which we usually approach comparable symmetries that might be stated as to all other asserted rights. The [F]ourteenth [A]mendment forbids inequality and irrational denial of liberty by law. 96 It was surely anticipated that the following of these directives would entail some disagreeableness. The disagreeableness might take many forms; the straight white man, for example, might dislike having an African-American gay neighbor, or dislike having lesbians with school children in his PTA community. When the directives of equality and liberty cannot be followed without displeasing the dissenters, then something that can be called a "freedom" of the dissenters must be impaired. And if some insist that the prohibition on same-sex marriage was never meant to do harm to same-sex couples and conveyed no dignity harm worthy of constitutional attention, we should again respond with one of the sovereign prerogatives of philosophers-that of laughter.
Here again, Black might say, "Thy speech maketh thee manifest . . . ." Samesex marriage prohibitions, in all visible things, speak only haltingly any dialect but that of inequality and irrationality.
In short, the Constitution has everything to do with it. To insist otherwise is to blink in the face of Fourteenth Amendment reality, not merely stark social reality. Doing so was wrong in 1954, and was still wrong in 2015.
May not our living generation take the words [of the Declaration of Independence] not as a statement of creation already performed, but as an invitation to participate in that ongoing work of creation whose goal they define?
It may indeed, Black would argue. Then, and likely now. Black has the better of this argument, for reasons that make enduring, humane, and constitutional sense.
The holding in Obergefell, like the holding in Brown, will echo through the ages. Both of these terrain-altering, controversial, and audacious Fourteenth Amendment decisions were lawful, in the sense that Black defined constitutional lawfulness decades ago. Both decisions better perfected constitutional liberty and equality, and both rested on the "overwhelming weight of reason."
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The Roberts dissent, in contrast, may echo through the ages as well, but not in a good way. I predict it will become the opinion in Obergefell deemed the most extravagant, the most rhetorically excessive, and the most terribly and utterly wrong. This is all the more lamentable given that the opinion was written long after Brown, and long after Black showed us in such moving and clear ways why Brown was lawful. 113 Black's insights were original. We may not be able to match him, but we can honor and emulate him.
CONCLUSION
Black's scholarship was poetic and athletic, discerning and sensitive, intellectually sharp and morally compelling. He painted with all of the colors, not just black and white, vitriolic red or conservative pastels. His was the voice of constitutional and full-spectrum justice in a pure and rare sense.
